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assembly” part of “the Constitutional substitute for revolution.” In 1939, the popular press 
heralded it as one of the “four freedoms” at the core of the Bill of Rights.  And even as late as 
1973, John Rawls characterized it as one of the “basic liberties.”  But in the past thirty years, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The freedom of assembly has been at the heart of some of the 
most important social movements in American history:  antebellum 
abolitionism, women’s suffrage in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the labor movement in the Progressive Era and after the New 
Deal, and the Civil Rights movement.  Claims of assembly stood 
against the ideological tyranny that exploded during the first Red Scare 
in the years surrounding the First World War and the second Red Scare 
of 1950s’ McCarthyism.  Abraham Lincoln once called “the right of 
peaceable assembly” part of “the Constitutional substitute for revolu-
tion.”1  In 1939, the popular press heralded it as one of the “four 
freedoms” at the core of the Bill of Rights.  And even as late as 1973, 
John Rawls characterized it as one of the “basic liberties.”2  But in the 
past thirty years, the freedom of assembly has been reduced to a 
historical footnote in American political theory and law.  Why has 
assembly so utterly disappeared from our democratic fabric? 
 One might, with good reason, contend that the right of assembly 
has been subsumed into the rights of speech and association and that 
these two rights provide adequate protection for the people gathered.  
On this account, contemporary free speech doctrine protects the “most 
pristine and classic form” of assembly—the occasional gathering of 
temporary duration that often takes the form of a protest, parade, or 
demonstration.3  Meanwhile, the judicially recognized right of 
association shelters forms of assembly that extend across time and 
place—groups like clubs, churches, and social organizations. 
 This characterization of the rights of speech and association is not 
implausible.  Indeed, it appears to be the approach assumed by a 
                                                 
 1. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Alexander H. Stephens (Jan. 19, 1860), in 
UNCOLLECTED LETTERS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 127 (Gilbert A. Tracy ed., 1917).  In the same 
letter, Lincoln also wrote:  “[T]he right of peaceable assembly and of petition and by article 
Fifth of the Constitution, the right of amendment, is the Constitutional substitute for 
revolution.  Here is our Magna Carta not wrested by Barons from King John, but the free gift 
of states to the nation they create . . . .”  Id. 
 2. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53 (1971).  Rawls relies primarily on 
association rather than assembly in his later work.  See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 221 n.8, 291, 338, 418 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].  But 
cf. id. at 335 (mentioning assembly). 
 3. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (“most pristine and classic 
form”). 
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number of contemporary political theorists.4  Nevertheless, I want to 
suggest that something is lost when assembly is dichotomously 
construed as either a moment of expression (when it is viewed as 
speech) or an expressionless group (when it is viewed as association).  
Many group expressions are only made intelligible by the practices 
that give them meaning.  The rituals and liturgy of religious worship 
often embody deeper meaning than that which would be ascribed to 
them by an outside observer.  The political significance of a women’s 
pageant in the 1920s would be lost without an understanding of why 
these women gathered or what they were doing with the rest of their 
lives.  And the creeds and songs recited by members of hundreds of 
diverse associations, from Alcoholics Anonymous to the Boy Scouts, 
during their gatherings may reflect a way of living and system of 
beliefs that cannot be captured by a text or its utterance at any one 
event.5 
 The United States Supreme Court has partially recognized these 
connections in the category of “expressive association” that it 
introduced in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.6  But by privileging 
“intimate” over expressive association and declaring the latter merely 
instrumentally valuable to other modes of communication, the Court 
has obfuscated the critical role that a group’s practices and identity 
play in its expression.  Even worse, the attenuated protections of 
expressive association underwrite a political theory whose espoused 
tolerance ends with those groups that challenge the fundamental 
assumptions of the liberal state.  These changes open the door for the 
state to demand what Nancy Rosenblum has called a “logic of congru-
ence” requiring “that the internal life and organization of associations 
mirror liberal democratic principles and practices.”7 
 William Galston intimates that this result undermines liberalism 
itself:  “Liberalism requires a robust though rebuttable presumption in 
favor of individuals and groups leading their lives as they see fit, 
within a broad range of legitimate variation, in accordance with their 
                                                 
 4. See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES:  CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND 
COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1998); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2. 
 5. This argument is not meant to be universal.  Some assemblies that gather in single 
instances of fixed duration may present a relatively coherent message absent any collective 
background identity.  A group of strangers that gathers in front of a prison to protest an 
execution is one example. 
 6. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 622 (1984). 
 7. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS:  THE PERSONAL USES OF 
PLURALISM IN AMERICA 37 (1998). 
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own understanding of what gives life meaning and value.”8  We do not 
live under Galston’s “rebuttable presumption.”  If we did, we might 
hear more about polygamist Mormons, communist schoolteachers, all-
male Jaycees, and peyote-consuming Native Americans.  And while 
today’s cultural and legal climate raises the most serious challenges to 
practices at odds with liberal democratic values, the eclectic collection 
of groups that have at one time or another been silenced and stilled by 
the state cuts across political and ideological boundaries.  The freedom 
of assembly has opposed these incursions throughout our nation’s 
history.  As C. Edwin Baker has argued, “[T]he function of constitu-
tional rights, and more specifically the role of the right of assembly, is 
to protect self-expressive, nonviolent, noncoercive conduct from 
majority norms or political balancing and even to permit people to be 
offensive, annoying, or challenging to dominant norms.”9  This core 
role of assembly and its broad appeal to groups of markedly different 
ideologies makes it a better “fit” than the right of association within 
our nation’s legal and political heritage.10 
 Recognizing this fit requires learning the story of the right of 
assembly.  This is no easy task.  The right of association is now firmly 
entrenched in our legal and political vernacular.  Consider the 
following:  (1) at least twenty-five federal district and appellate court 
opinions have referred to a nonexistent “freedom of association 
clause” in the United States Constitution;11 (2) a federal appellate court 
has denied associational protections to an all-male Jewish fraternity 
after intimating that the fraternity was neither an intimate nor an 
                                                 
 8. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM:  THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE 
PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (2002). 
 9. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 134 (1989). 
 10. By “fit,” I mean to suggest the coherence with an ongoing tradition and social 
practice intimated in different ways by both Ronald Dworkin and Alasdair MacIntyre.  See 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE:  A STUDY 
IN MORAL THEORY (3d ed., Univ. Notre Dame Press 2007) (1981). 
 11. See, e.g., Swanson v. City of Bruce, No. 03-60541, 2004 WL 1491594, at *3 (5th 
Cir. July 1, 2004) (referring to “the freedom of association clause”); Boyle v. County of 
Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 394 (3d Cir. 1998) (asserting that the plurality opinion in Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), “held that the discharge of a government employee because of 
his political affiliation violates the freedom of association clause of the First Amendment”); 
Darnell v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, No. 90-5453, 1991 WL 11255 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 
1991) (discussing the requirements for a prima facie case under “the freedom of association 
clause of the first amendment”); Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 235 F. 
Supp. 2d 1186, 1203 (D. Wyo. 2006) (“The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and 
Freedom of Association Clauses apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”); 
Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 543 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (“The Supreme Court 
has interpreted the First Amendment to provide little protection under the Freedom of 
Association Clause to commercial enterprises.”). 
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expressive association;12 and (3) a well-respected commentator has 
argued that in sixteen years, Roberts came to represent “a well-settled 
law of freedom of association,” an “ancien regime.”13  In this context, it 
takes effort to envision an alternative understanding of the 
constitutional protections for groups.  Accordingly, part of my task is 
to cast a vision for recovering the freedom of assembly.  Doing so 
requires creative engagement with regnant legal doctrine and political 
theory, particularly that espoused by the Supreme Court and its 
commentators over the past half-century.  But this is a task worth 
doing.  Constitutional language—and the ways in which we use it or 
ignore it—matters to the views we form about the law.  Words like 
“assembly” and “association” by themselves convey little of the values 
that underlie the inevitable line-drawing that takes place around our 
civil liberties,14 but in our constitutional story, these words come to 
represent the values that helped to shape them and give them 
constitutional salience.15  Forgetting words may represent the final 
stage of forgetting values; reclaiming words can be a first step to 
reclaiming those values. 
                                                 
 12. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136 
(2d Cir. 2007).  The fraternity was located at the College of Staten Island, which is “primarily 
a commuter campus,” and it never had more than twenty members.  Id. at 140, 145. 
 13. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE?:  HOW THE CASE OF BOY 
SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF FREE ASSOCIATION, at xi (2009) 
(arguing that Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), “disrupted” the law of 
freedom of association).  Koppelman acknowledges the “germinal case” of the right of 
association in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), see KOPPELMAN, supra, at 18-22, but 
it is clear that Roberts rather than NAACP v. Alabama does most of the work that he wants to 
embrace as the “well-settled law of freedom of association.” 
 14. I do not presume that unbounded group autonomy is either preferable or possible.  
To borrow from Stanley Fish, there is “no such thing as free assembly.” The state always 
constrains.  The pertinent inquiry is therefore not whether the state can constrain group 
autonomy, but the conditions under which those constraints will be imposed.  See STANLEY 
FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 104 (1994) 
(“Speech, in short, is never a value in and of itself but is always produced within the precincts 
of some assumed conception of the good to which it must yield in the event of conflict.”); cf. 
Peter de Marneffe, Rights, Reasons, and Freedom of Association, in FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION, supra note 4, AT 146 (“Some may think of rights as ‘absolute,’ believing that to 
say that there is a right to some liberty is to say that the government may not interfere with 
this liberty for any reason.  But if this is how rights are understood, there are virtually no 
rights to liberty—because for virtually every liberty there will be some morally sufficient 
reason for the government to interfere with it.”). 
 15. Frederick Schauer uses the phrase “constitutional salience” to refer to “the often 
mysterious political, social, cultural, historical, psychological, rhetorical, and economic forces 
that influence which policy questions surface as constitutional issues and which do not.”  
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004). 
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 In the pages that follow, I take this first step by tracing the story 
of the freedom of assembly.  This is the right of assembly “violently 
wrested” from enslaved and free African Americans in the South and 
denied to abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison in the North.  It is the 
freedom recognized in public celebrations across the nation as 
America entered the Second World War—at the very time it was 
denied to 120,000 Japanese Americans.  It is the right placed at the 
core of democracy by eminent twentieth-century Americans, including 
Dorothy Thompson, Zechariah Chafee, Louis Brandeis, Orson Welles, 
and Eleanor Roosevelt. 
 I begin by examining the constitutional grounding of assembly in 
the Bill of Rights.  I then explore the use of assembly in legal and 
political discourse in six periods of American history:  (1) the closing 
years of the eighteenth century that brought the first test of assembly 
through the Democratic-Republican Societies; (2) the appeals to 
assembly in the suffragist and abolitionist movements of the 
antebellum era; (3) the narrowing of the constitutional right of 
assembly by the Supreme Court following the Civil War; (4) the claims 
of assembly by suffragists, civil rights activists, and organized labor 
during the Progressive Era; (5) the rhetorical high point of assembly 
between the two World Wars; and (6) the end of assembly amidst mid-
twentieth century liberalism and the rise of the freedom of association. 
 As I recount the role of assembly in the political history of the 
United States, I pay particular attention to three of its characteristics.  
First, groups invoking the right of assembly have inherently been those 
that dissent from the majority and consensus standards endorsed by 
government.  Second, claims of assembly have been public claims that 
advocate for a visible political space distinguishable from government.  
Finally, manifestations of assembly have themselves been forms of 
expression—parades, strikes, and demonstrations, but also more 
creative forms of engagement like pageants, religious worship, and the 
sharing of meals.  These three themes—the dissenting assembly, the 
public assembly, and the expressive assembly—emerge from the 
groups that have gathered throughout our nation’s history.  Theirs is the 
story of the forgotten freedom of assembly.16 
                                                 
 16. My characterization of dissenting, public, and expressive assembly bears some 
resemblance to Timothy Zick’s emphasis on the relationship between expression and physical 
space.  See TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS:  PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT 
LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES (2009).  Zick observes, “In First Amendment doctrine and 
scholarship, place has generally been treated as a background principle, not a fundamental 
aspect of assembly, expression, and other public liberties.”  Id. at 8.  He responds that “places 
ground and give meaning to lives, activities, and cultures.”  Id. at 10.  My argument for 
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY 
 I begin with the text of the First Amendment and with a textual 
observation.  As a historical matter, we should not make too much of 
slight variations in wording, grammar, and punctuation in constitu-
tional clauses.17  There is little indication that the Framers applied our 
level of exegetical scrutiny to the texts that they considered and 
created.  But because modern constitutional law parses wording so 
carefully, our current arguments are in many ways constrained by the 
precise text handed down to us.  And so it is for this reason a useful 
exercise to consider forensically the text that has survived, as well as 
the text that did not. 
A. The Common Good 
 The most important aspect of the clause containing the 
constitutional right of assembly may be three words missing from its 
final formulation:  the common good.  Had antecedent versions of the 
assembly clause prevailed in the debates over the Bill of Rights and 
lawful assembly been limited to purposes serving the common good, 
the kinds of marginalized and disfavored groups that have sought 
refuge in its protections may have met with little success.  Assembly 
for the common good would have endorsed the consensus narrative 
advanced by mid-twentieth century pluralism:  we tolerate groups only 
to the extent that they serve the common good and thereby strengthen 
the stability and vitality of democracy.18  The Framers decided 
otherwise. 
 When the First Congress convened in 1789 to draft amendments 
to the Constitution, it considered proposals submitted by the various 
states.  Virginia and North Carolina proposed identical amendments 
covering the rights of assembly and petition:  “That the people have a 
                                                                                                             
assembly builds upon Zick’s theoretical approach by considering practices as well as places in 
the background that gives coherence to meaning. 
 17. Caleb Nelson cautions against placing too much reliance on punctuation in the 
Constitution because at the time of the Founding “punctuation marks [were] thought to lack 
the legal status of words.”  Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 258 (2000).  He 
notes that “[t]he ratification of the Constitution by the states reflects this relatively casual 
attitude toward punctuation” because many states that incorporated a copy of the Constitution 
in the official form of ratification varied its punctuation.  Id. at 258 n.102.  Nelson cites as an 
example the copy of the Constitution in the Pennsylvania form of ratification, which used 
“different punctuation marks than the Constitution engrossed at the Federal Convention” in 
roughly thirty-five places.  Id. 
 18. For a critique of the consensus narrative and its relationship to the constitutional 
right of association, see John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the Constitutional Right of 
Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
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right peaceably to assemble together to consult for the common good, 
or to instruct their representatives; and that every freeman has a right 
to petition or apply to the Legislature for redress of grievances.”19 
 New York and Rhode Island offered slightly different wording, 
emphasizing that the people assembled for “their” common good 
rather than “the” common good:  “That the people have a right 
peaceably to assemble together to consult for the common good, or to 
instruct their Representatives; and that every [person] has a right to 
petition or apply to the legislature for redress of grievances.”20 
 On June 8, 1789, James Madison’s proposal to the House favored 
the possessive pronoun over the definite article:  “The people shall not 
be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their 
common good; nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or 
remonstrances for redress of their grievances.”21 
 Whether intentional or not, the endorsement of the common good 
of the people who assemble rather than the common good of the state 
signaled the possibility that the interests of the people assembled need 
not be coterminous with the interests of those in power. 
 The point was not lost during the House debates.  When Thomas 
Hartley of Pennsylvania contended that, with respect to assembly, 
“every thing that was not incompatible with the general good ought to 
be granted,”22  Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts replied that if Hartley 
“supposed that the people had a right to consult for the common good” 
but “could not consult unless they met for the purpose,” he was in fact 
“contend[ing] for nothing.”23  In other words, if the right of assembly 
encompassed only the common good from the perspective of the state, 
then its use as a means of protest or dissent would be eviscerated.24 
 On August 19, 1789, the House approved a version of the 
amendment that retained the reference to “their common good” and 
also incorporated the rights of speech and press:  “The freedom of 
                                                 
 19. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 
140 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS].  This language is 
substantially similar to declarations in North Carolina and Pennsylvania in 1776 that “the 
People have a Right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their 
Representatives, and to apply to the Legislature for Redress of Grievances.”  Id. at 141. 
 20. Id. at 140. 
 21. Id. at 129. 
 22. Id. at 145 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)). 
 23. Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 760-61 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)). 
 24. Cf. Melvin Rishe, Freedom of Assembly, 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 317, 337 (1965) 
(“Were the courts truly bound to delve into whether or not an assembly served the common 
good, it is likely that many assemblies that have been held to be protected by the constitution 
would lose this protection.”). 
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speech and of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply to the 
government for redress of grievances shall not be infringed.”25 
 Eleven days later, the Senate defeated a motion to strike the 
reference to the common good.26  But the following week, the text 
inexplicably dropped out when the Senate merged language pertaining 
to religion into the draft amendment:  “Congress shall make no law 
establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the 
free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or the 
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition to 
the government for the redress of grievances.”27 
B. Assembly and Petition 
 The striking of the reference to the common good may have been 
intended to broaden the scope of the assembly clause, but it also 
introduced a textual ambiguity.  Without the prepositional “for their 
common good” following the reference to assembly, the text now 
described “the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”28  This left 
ambiguous whether the amendment recognized a single right to 
assemble for the purpose of petitioning the government or whether it 
established both an unencumbered right of assembly and a separate 
right of petition. 
 In one of the only recent considerations of assembly in the First 
Amendment, Jason Mazzone argues in favor of the former.29  Mazzone 
suggests: 
                                                 
 25. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 143 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  This version also changed the semicolon after “common good” to a comma. 
 26. S. Journal, 1st Cong., 70 (Sept. 3, 1789).  The following day the Senate adopted 
similar language:  “That Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for their common 
good, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”  Id. at 70-71 (Sept. 4, 1789) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. Id. at 77 (Sept. 9, 1789).  The amendment took its final form on September 24, 
1789:  “Congress shall make no Law respecting an establishment of Religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of Speech, or of the Press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”  THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 136 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 28. Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639 (2002) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 29. Id.  The only recent article to address the history of free assembly other than 
Mazzone’s is Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543 
(2009). 
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There are two clues that we should understand assembly and petition to 
belong together.  The first clue is the use of “and to petition,” which 
contrasts with the use of “or” in the remainder of the First Amendment’s 
language.  The second clue is the use of “right,” in the singular (as in 
“the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition”), rather 
than the plural “rights” (as in “the rights of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition”).  The prohibitions on Congress’ power can 
therefore be understood as prohibitions with respect to speech, press, 
and assembly in order to petition the government.30 
Mazzone’s interpretation is problematic because the comma preceding 
the phrase “and to petition” appears to be residual from the earlier text 
that had described the “right of the people peaceably to assemble and 
consult for their common good, and to apply to the government for a 
redress of grievances.”31  Whether left in deliberately or inadvertently, it 
relates back to a distinction between a right to peaceable assembly and 
a right to petition.32  Moreover, at least some members of the First 
Congress appeared to have conceived of a broader notion of assembly, 
as evidenced in an exchange between Theodore Sedgwick of 
Massachusetts and John Page of Virginia. 
                                                 
 30. Mazzone, supra note 29, at 712-13 (internal citations omitted).  But see AKHIL 
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 26 (1998) (referring to 
assembly and petition as separate clauses); WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT:  
CASES AND MATERIALS 32 (2d ed. 1995) (referring to a distinct “‘peaceably to assemble’ 
clause”); JAMES E. LEAHY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 1791-1991:  TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF 
FREEDOM 202 (1991) (“The final wording of the First Amendment indicates that the first 
Congress intended to protect the right of the people to assemble for whatever purposes and at 
the same time to be assured of a separate right to petition the government if they chose to do 
so.”). 
 31. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 143.  The earlier version 
derived in turn from Madison’s draft.  Id. at 129.  Mazzone recognizes that “in Madison’s 
draft, assembly is separated from petitioning by a semi-colon, perhaps indicating that while 
the right of assembly is related to the right of petition, assembly is not necessarily limited to 
formulating petitions.”  Mazzone, supra note 29, at 715 n.409. 
 32. Mazzone addresses the comma in a footnote and argues that because it “mirrors 
the comma” preceding the words “or prohibit the free exercise thereof ” in the first half of the 
First Amendment, “[i]t does not therefore signal a right of petition separate from the right of 
assembly.”  Id. at 713 n.392 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The argument for textual 
parallelism does not hold because the free exercise clause explicitly refers back to “religion” 
(before the comma) with the word “thereof.”  A closer parallel—which illustrates Mazzone’s 
interpretive problem—is the suggestion that the comma separating speech and press connotes 
that they embody only a singular freedom.  My quibbles with Mazzone do not diminish my 
appreciation for his work.  Mazzone is one of the few scholars in recent years to notice the 
relationship between assembly and association, and his thoughtful article posits a number of 
ideas with which I am highly sympathetic.  See, e.g., id. at 646 (arguing that assembly and 
petition provide “a much firmer constitutional basis for protecting the rights of citizens to 
come together in collective activities” than “expressive association”). 
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 During the House debates over the language of the Bill of Rights, 
Sedgwick criticized the proposed right of assembly as redundant in 
light of the freedom of speech:  “If people freely converse together, 
they must assemble for that purpose; it is a self-evident, unalienable 
right which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that never would 
be called in question; it is derogatory to the dignity of the House to 
descend to such minutiae.”33 
 Page responded: 
[Sedgwick] supposes [the right of assembly] no more essential than 
whether a man has a right to wear his hat or not, but let me observe to 
him that such rights have been opposed, and a man has been obliged to 
pull off his hat when he appeared before the face of authority; people 
have also been prevented from assembling together on their lawful 
occasions, therefore it is well to guard against such stretches of 
authority, by inserting the privilege in the declaration of rights; if the 
people could be deprived of the power of assembling under any pretext 
whatsoever, they might be deprived of every other privilege contained 
in the clause.34 
Irving Brant notes that while Page’s allusion to a man without a hat is 
lost on a contemporary audience, “[t]he mere reference to it was 
equivalent to half an hour of oratory” before the First Congress.35  Page 
was referring to the trial of William Penn.36 
 On August 14, 1670, Penn and other Quakers had attempted to 
gather for worship at their meeting-house on Gracechurch Street, 
London, in violation of the 1664 Conventicle Act that forbade any 
Nonconformists attending a religious meeting, or assembling them-
selves together to the number of more than five persons in addition to 
members of the family, for any religious purpose not according to the 
rules of the Church of England.37  Prevented from entering by a 
company of soldiers, Penn began delivering a sermon to the Quakers 
assembled in the street.  Penn and a fellow Quaker, William Mead, 
were arrested and brought to trial in a dramatic sequence of events that 
included a contempt of court charge stemming from their wearing of 
hats in the courtroom.38  A jury acquitted the two men on the charge 
                                                 
 33. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 143-44. 
 34. Id. at 144 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)). 
 35. IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 55 (1965). 
 36. Id. at 54-61. 
 37. Conventicle Act, 1664, 16 Car. 2, c. 4 (Eng.). 
 38. BRANT, supra note 35, at 57 (quoting Penn’s journal).  Penn and Mead were fined 
for contempt of court for wearing their hats after being ordered by an officer of the court to 
put them on.  Id. 
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that their public worship constituted an unlawful assembly.  The case 
gained renown throughout England and the American colonies.39  
According to Brant: 
William Penn loomed large in American history, but even if he had 
never crossed the Atlantic, bringing the Quaker religion with him, 
Americans would have known about his “tumultuous assembly” and his 
hat.  Few pamphlets of the seventeenth century had more avid readers 
than the one entitled “The People’s Ancient and Just Liberties, asserted, 
in the Trial of William Penn and William Mead at the Old Bailey, 22 
Charles II 1670, written by themselves.”  Congressman Page had 
known the story from boyhood, reproduced in Emlyn’s State Trials to 
which his father subscribed in 1730.  It was available, both in the State 
Trials and as a pamphlet, to the numerous congressmen who had used 
the facilities of the City Library of Philadelphia.  Madison had an 
account of it written by Sir John Hawles, a libertarian lawyer who 
became Solicitor General after the overthrow of the Stuarts in 1688.40 
Congressman Page’s allusion to Penn made clear that the right of 
assembly under discussion in the House encompassed more than 
meeting to petition for redress of grievances:  Penn’s ordeal had 
nothing to do with petition; it was an act of religious worship.  After 
Page spoke, the House defeated Sedgwick’s motion to strike assembly 
from the draft amendment by a “considerable majority.”41  On 
September 24, 1789, the Senate approved the amendment in its final 
form, and the subsequent ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 
enacted “the right of the people peaceably to assemble.”42 
 The text handed down to us thus conveys a broad notion of 
assembly in two ways.  First, it does not limit the purposes of assembly 
to the common good, thereby implicitly allowing assembly for 
purposes that might be antithetical to that good (although constraining 
assembly to peaceable means).  Second, it does not limit assembly to 
the purposes of petitioning the government, which means that the 
constitutional expression of assembly may take many forms for many 
                                                 
 39. In addition to its pronouncement on the right of assembly, the case became an 
important precedent for the independence of juries.  Following their verdict of acquittal, the 
trial judge had imprisoned the jurors, who were later vindicated in habeas corpus 
proceedings. 
 40. BRANT, supra note 35, at 55-56 (emphasis omitted). 
 41. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 145 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 761 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)). 
 42. “Congress shall make no Law respecting an establishment of Religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of Speech, or of the Press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”  Id. at 136 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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purposes.  Neither of these broad interpretations of the right to 
assembly has been readily acknowledged in legal and political 
discourse.  But the larger vision of assembly can be found in the 
practices of people who have gathered throughout American history.  It 
is to these practices that I now turn. 
III. THE FIRST TEST OF ASSEMBLY:  THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN 
SOCIETIES 
 The nascent freedom of assembly faced an early challenge when 
the first sustained political dissent in the new republic emerged out of 
the increasingly partisan divide between Federalists and Republicans.  
By the summer of 1792, Republican concern over the Federalist 
administration and its perceived support of the British in their conflict 
with the French had reached new levels of agitation.  The Republican-
leaning National Gazette began calling for the creation of voluntary 
“constitutional” and “political” societies to critique the Washington 
administration.43 
 The first society was organized in Philadelphia in March of 
1793.44  Over the next three years, dozens more emerged throughout 
most of the major cities in the United States.45  These “Democratic-
Republican” societies consisted largely of farmers and laborers wary 
of the aristocratic leanings of Hamilton and other Federalists, but they 
also included lawyers, doctors, publishers, and government 
employees.46  The largest society—the Democratic Society of 
Pennsylvania—boasted over three hundred members.47 
 The societies “invariably proclaimed the right of citizens to 
assemble.”48  A 1794 resolution from a society in Washington, North 
Carolina, asserted:  “It is the unalienable right of a free and 
                                                 
 43. Robert M. Chesney, Democratic-Republican Societies, Subversion, and the 
Limits of Legitimate Political Dissent in the Early Republic, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1525, 1536 n.46 
(2004).  Mazzone also highlights the importance of the Democratic-Republican Societies to 
early interpretations of assembly and association.  Mazzone, supra note 29, at 734-42. 
 44. Philip S. Foner, The Democratic-Republican Societies:  An Introduction, in THE 
DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN SOCIETIES, 1790-1800:  A DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK OF 
CONSTITUTIONS, DECLARATIONS, ADDRESS, RESOLUTIONS AND TOASTS 6 (Philip S. Foner ed., 
1976). 
 45. Although the exact number is disputed, there were probably around forty 
societies.  Chesney, supra note 43, at 1537 n.52. 
 46. Foner, supra note 44, at 7; EUGENE PERRY LINK, DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN 
SOCIETIES, 1790-1800, at 71-74 (Octagon Books 1965) (1942); Chesney, supra note 43, at 
1538 n.54.  The term “Democratic-Republican Societies” comes from historians.  Chesney, 
supra note 43, at 1527 n.5. 
 47. Foner, supra note 44, at 7. 
 48. Id. at 11. 
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independent people to assemble together in a peaceable manner to 
discuss with firmness and freedom all subjects of public concern.”49  
That same year, Boston’s Independent Chronicle declared: 
Under a Constitution which expressly provides “That the people have a 
right in an orderly and peaceable manner to assemble and consult upon 
the common good,” there can be no necessity for an apology to the 
public for an Association of a number of citizens to promote and 
cherish the social virtues, the love of their country and a respect for its 
Laws and Constitutions.50 
 The societies usually met monthly, although more frequently 
during elections or times of political crisis.51  According to Philip 
Foner, a large part of their activities consisted of “creating public 
discussions; composing, adopting, and issuing circulars, memorials, 
resolutions, and addresses to the people; and remonstrances to the 
President and the Congress—all expressing the feelings of the 
assembled groups on current political issues.”52  But in addition to 
meeting to discuss political issues, the societies also joined in the 
“extraordinarily diverse array of . . . feasts, festivals, and parades” that 
unfolded in the streets and public places of American cities.53  
Collectively, the activities of the societies “embodied an understanding 
of popular sovereignty and representation in which the role of the 
citizen was not limited to periodic voting, but instead entailed active 
and constant engagement in political life.”54  As Simon Newman’s 
study of popular celebrations of this era observes, these kinds of 
gatherings were self-consciously political expressions: 
Festive culture required both participants and an audience, and by 
printing and reprinting accounts of July Fourth celebrations and the like 
newspapers contributed to a greatly enlarged sense of audience:  by the 
                                                 
 49. Id. (quoting NORTH-CAROLINA GAZETTE (New Bern), Apr. 19, 1794). 
 50. Id. at 25 (quoting INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Boston), Jan. 16, 1794).  It is 
unclear what authority the paper is quoting—the italicized text is not from the Constitution. 
 51. Id. at 10.  El-Haj notes that “the centrality of large gatherings of people in public 
spaces as part of the election festivities—to eat, drink, and parade and by implication to 
affirm their role as participants in the new nation.”  El-Haj, supra note 29, at 555. 
 52. Foner, supra note 44, at 10. 
 53. SIMON P. NEWMAN, PARADES AND THE POLITICS OF THE STREET:  FESTIVE CULTURE 
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 2 (1997).  These rituals were “vital elements of political 
life” practiced by ordinary Americans in the early republic.  Id. at 5.  While Newman cautions 
that some participants may have been interested only in “the festive aspects of public 
occasions and holidays,” he writes that it was “all but impossible for these people, whatever 
their original motives for taking part, to avoid making public political statements by and 
through their participation:  both their presence and their participation involve some degree of 
politicization and an expression of political identity and power in a public setting.”  Id. at 8-9. 
 54. Chesney, supra note 43, at 1539. 
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end of the 1790s those who participated in these events knew that their 
actions were quite likely going to be read about and interpreted by 
citizens far beyond the confines of their own community.55 
Celebrations of the French Revolution took on an especially partisan 
character when members and supporters of the emerging Federalist 
party refused to participate in them.56  Without the endorsement of the 
Federalist government, Republicans “were forced to foster alternative 
ways of validating celebrations that were often explicitly opposi-
tional.”57  In doing so, they characterized their tributes as representing 
the unified views of the entire community rather than just political 
elites.  Newman writes: 
The result of the Democratic Republican stratagem was that members 
of subordinate groups—including women, the poor, and black 
Americans, all of whom were excluded from or had strictly 
circumscribed roles in the white male contests over July Fourth and 
Washington’s birthday celebrations—found a larger role for themselves 
in French Revolutionary celebrations than in any of the other rites and 
festivals of the early American republic.58 
The relatively egalitarian gestures of these celebrations were not well 
received by Federalists, who berated the women who participated in 
them with sarcasm and derision and raised fears about black 
participation.59 
 Federalists became increasingly agitated with the growing 
popular appeal of the societies.  The pages of the pro-Federalist 
Gazette of the United States repeatedly warned that the societies were 
fostering disruptive tendencies and instigating rebellion.60  And while 
there was little basis in fact to suggest that the societies were behind 
the Whiskey Rebellion, the Federalist press was quick to highlight that 
several members of societies in western Pennsylvania had been 
actively involved in the insurrection.61 
 President Washington came to believe that the widespread public 
condemnation of the rebellion had created a political opportunity for 
                                                 
 55. NEWMAN, supra note 53, at 3. 
 56. Id. at 120. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 122.  It is important not to overstate these egalitarian glimpses.  The officers 
of the societies were “virtually without exception men of considerable substance.”  STANLEY 
ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 458 (1993). 
 59. NEWMAN, supra note 53, at 128-30. 
 60. Chesney, supra note 43, at 1546. 
 61. Id. at 1557-58. 
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the “annihilation” of the societies.62  He had been incensed by their 
organized opposition to the whiskey tax, writing in a personal letter 
that while “no one denies the right of the people to meet occasionally, 
to petition for, or to remonstrate against, any Act of the Legislature,” 
nothing could be “more absurd, more arrogant, or more pernicious to 
the peace of Society, than for . . . a self created permanent body” that 
would pass judgment on such acts.63  Washington took clear aim at the 
societies in his annual address to Congress on November 19, 1794, 
asserting that “associations of men” and “certain self-created societies” 
had fostered the violent rebellion.64  Robert Chesney suggests that 
“[t]he speech was widely understood at the time not as ordinary 
political criticism, but instead as a denial of the legality of organized 
and sustained political dissent.”65  And Irving Brant observes that “[t]he 
damning epithet ‘self-created’ indorsed the current notion that 
ordinary people had no right to come together for political purposes.”66 
 The Federalist-controlled Senate quickly censured the societies in 
response to Washington’s address.  The House, in contrast, began an 
extended debate about the wording of its response, and assigned James 
Madison, Theodore Sedgwick, and Thomas Scott to draft a reply.  The 
Federalist Sedgwick, who years earlier had suggested that the freedom 
of assembly was so “self-evident” and “unalienable” that its inclusion 
in the constitutional amendments was unnecessary,67 now argued in 
spite of the First Amendment that the societies’ efforts to organize 
were effectively illegal.68  After four days of debate, Madison conten-
ded that a House censure would be a “severe punishment” and would 
have dire consequences for the future of free expression.69  The final 
language in the House response was substantially more muted than 
that issued by the Senate. 
 Following Washington’s address and the congressional response, 
“[s]pirited debates concerning the legitimacy of the societies were 
                                                 
 62. Id. at 1559 (quoting Letter from President George Washington to Governor Henry 
Lee (Aug. 26, 1794), in THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 475 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 
1940)). 
 63. Id. at 1526 (quoting Letter from President George Washington to Burges Ball 
(Sept. 25, 1794), in THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 62, at 506. 
 64. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 788 (1794) (statement of President George Washington). 
 65. Chesney, supra note 43, at 1561. 
 66. IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON:  FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1800, 417 
(1950). 
 67. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 143-44. 
 68. Chesney, supra note 43, at 1562-63. 
 69. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (statement of Rep. Madison). 
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conducted in every community where a society existed.”70  Due in part 
to Washington’s wide popularity, public opinion turned the corner 
against the societies.  Many of them folded completely within a year of 
the President’s speech, and by the end of the decade, all had been 
driven out of existence.71  Yet despite their relatively short duration, the 
societies’ influence was not inconsequential.  According to Foner, “As 
a center of Republican agitation and propaganda . . . the societies did 
much to forge the sword that defeated Federalism and put Jefferson in 
the presidency.”72  They did so through public and political activities, 
physical and communal gatherings that displayed their enthusiasm and 
sought to sway public opinion.  But as significant as these first 
assertions of assembly were the heavy handed political attacks against 
them.  The vigorous resistance to the claims of the people assembled 
from those in power demonstrated the precarious nature of dissenting 
groups in the new republic. 
IV. ASSEMBLY IN THE ANTEBELLUM ERA 
 In spite of the government’s response to the Democratic-
Republican societies, the idea that the people could assemble apart 
from the sanction of the state continued to take hold in early American 
political life.  Benjamin Oliver’s 1832 treatise, The Rights of an 
American Citizen, called the right of assembly “one of the strongest 
safeguards, against any usurpation or tyrannical abuse of power, so 
long as the people collectively have sufficient discernment to perceive 
what is best for the public interest, and individually have independence 
enough, to express an opinion in opposition to a popular but designing 
leader.”73  Writing in 1838, the state theorist Francis Lieber described 
“those many extra-constitutional, not unconstitutional, meetings, in 
which the citizens either unite their scattered means for the obtaining 
of some common end, social in general, or political in particular, or 
express their opinion in definite resolutions upon some important 
                                                 
 70. Foner, supra note 44, at 33. 
 71. Chesney, supra note 43, at 1528. 
 72. Foner, supra note 44, at 40. 
 73. BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 187 (1832).  Oliver 
limited his conception of assembly to discussions of “public measures.”  Id. at 195.  His 
lukewarm description warned that assemblies “called on the most unexceptionable business” 
to serve “chiefly as occasions for haranguing the people, and exciting their passions by loud 
and florid declamation, delivered with the regulated and precise gesture of the academy, and 
with all the generous and glowing ardor of holiday patriotism” but are nevertheless “a great 
improvement on the affrays, tumults, riots and public disturbances, which in many countries 
invariably attend numerous and irregular assemblies of the people.”  Id. 
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point before the people.”74  These “public meetings” were undertaken 
for a variety of purposes: 
[T]hey are of great importance in order to direct public attention to 
subjects of magnitude, to test the opinion of the community, to inform 
persons at a distance, representatives or the administration, for instance, 
of the state of public opinion on certain measures, whether yet 
depending or adopted; to resolve upon and adopt petitions; to 
encourage individuals or bodies of men in arduous undertakings 
requiring the moral support of well-expressed public approbation; to 
effect a union with others, striving for the same ends; to disseminate 
knowledge by way of reports of committees; to form societies for 
charitable purposes or the melioration of laws or institutions; to 
sanction by the spontaneous expression of the opinion of the 
community measures not strictly agreeing with the letter of the law, but 
enforced by necessity; to call upon the services of individuals who 
otherwise would not feel warranted to appear before the public and 
invite its attention, or feel authorized to interfere with a subject not 
strictly lying within their proper sphere of action; to concert upon more 
or less extensive measures of public utility, and whatever else their 
object may be.75 
A generation later, John Alexander Jameson referred to “wholly 
unofficial” gatherings and “spontaneous assemblages” that were 
protected by the right of peaceable assembly, a “common and most 
invaluable provision of our constitutions, State and Federal.”76  These 
assemblies were “at once the effects and the causes of social life and 
activity, doing for the state what the waves do for the sea:  they prevent 
stagnation, the precursor of decay and death.”77  They were “public 
opinion in the making—public opinion fit to be the basis of political 
action, because sound and wise, and not a mere echo of party cries and 
platforms.”78 
 The significance of free assembly to public opinion was not lost 
on policymakers in southern states, who routinely prohibited its 
exercise among slaves and free blacks.  A 1792 Georgia law restricted 
                                                 
 74. 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS:  DESIGNED CHIEFLY FOR THE 
USE OF COLLEGES AND STUDENTS AT LAW 295 (2d ed. 1881). 
 75. Id. at 296.  Lieber refers to “public meetings” at 471. 
 76. JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS:  
THEIR HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 4-5, 104 (4th ed. 1887).  Jameson also 
refers to “spontaneous conventions” and “spontaneous assemblages.”  Id. at 4. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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slaves from assembling “on pretense of feasting.”79  In South Carolina, 
an 1800 law forbade “slaves, free negroes, mulattoes, and mestizoes” 
from assembling for “mental instruction or religious worship.”80  An 
1804 Virginia statute made any meeting of slaves at night an unlawful 
assembly.81  In 1831, the Virginia Legislature declared “[a]ll meetings 
of free Negroes or mulattoes at any school house, church, meeting 
house or other place for teaching them reading or writing, either in the 
day or the night” to be an unlawful assembly.82 
 The restrictions on assembly intensified following Nat Turner’s 
1831 rebellion in Southampton County, Virginia, which resulted in the 
deaths of fifty-seven white men, women, and children.  Turner’s 
insurrection sent Virginia and other southern states into a panic.83  
Virginia Governor John Floyd made the rebellion the central theme of 
his December 5, 1831, address to the Legislature.84  Floyd thought that 
black preachers were behind a broader conspiracy for insurrection and 
had acquired “great ascendancy over the minds of their fellows.”85  He 
argued that these preachers had to be silenced “because, full of 
ignorance, they were incapable of inculcating anything but notions of 
the wildest superstition, thus preparing fit instruments in the hands of 
crafty agitators, to destroy the public tranquility.”86  In response, the 
Legislature strengthened Virginia’s black code by imposing additional 
restrictions on assembly for religious worship.87 
                                                 
 79. WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (3d 
ed. 1853). 
 80. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 81. JUNE PURCELL GUILD, BLACK LAWS OF VIRGINIA:  A SUMMARY OF THE 
LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF VIRGINIA CONCERNING NEGROES FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT 
71 (1936). 
 82. Id. at 175-76 (citing VIRGINIA LAWS 1831, ch. XXXIX). 
 83. See generally John W. Cromwell, The Aftermath of Nat Turner’s Insurrection, 5 J. 
NEGRO HIST. 208 (1920). 
 84. Id. at 218, 223. 
 85. Id. at 218. 
 86. Id. at 219 (quoting The Journal of the House of Delegates 9, 10 (1831)). 
 87. Id. at 230; see GUILD, supra note 81, at 106-07 (“[N]o slave, free Negro or 
mulatto shall preach, or hold any meeting for religious purposes either day or night.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  In 1848, chapter 120 of the Criminal Code decreed:  “It is an 
unlawful assembly of slaves, free Negroes or mulattoes for the purpose of religious worship 
when such worship is conducted by a slave, free Negro, or mulatto, and every such assembly 
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stated that “[a]ny white person assembly with slaves or free Negroes for purpose of 
instructing them to read or write, or associating with them in any unlawful assembly, shall be 
confined in jail not exceeding six months and fined not exceeding $100.00.”  Id. at 179. 
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 Concern over Turner’s rebellion also spawned additional 
restrictions on the assembly of slaves and free blacks in Maryland, 
Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, and Alabama.88  By 1835, “most 
southern states had outlawed the right of assembly and organization by 
free blacks, prohibited them from holding church services without a 
white clergyman present, required their adherence to slave curfews, 
and minimized their contact with slaves.”89  In 1836, Theodore Dwight 
Weld aptly referred to the oppressive restrictions on blacks as “‘the 
right of peaceably assembling’ violently wrested.”90 
 James Smith’s slave narrative highlights the importance of 
assembly for religious worship and the felt impact of its loss: 
The way in which we worshiped is almost indescribable.  The singing 
was accompanied by a certain ecstasy of motion, clapping of hands, 
tossing of heads, which would continue without cessation about half an 
hour; one would lead off in a kind of recitative style, others joining in 
the chorus.  The old house partook of the ecstasy; it rang with their 
jubilant shouts, and shook in all its joints. . . .  When Nat. Turner’s 
insurrection broke out, the colored people were forbidden to hold 
meetings among themselves.91 
The collective restrictions on assembly did not simply silence political 
dissent in a narrow sense:  they were an assault on an entire way of life, 
suppressing worship, education, and community among slave and free 
African Americans.92 
 While southern states increased their efforts to suppress the 
freedom of assembly for African Americans, abolitionists in the North 
expanded their reliance on the constitutional right to spread their 
message.  And because many abolitionists were women, freedom of 
assembly was “indelibly linked with the woman’s rights movement 
                                                 
 88. Cromwell, supra note 83, at 231-33. 
 89. 1 C. PETER RIPLEY, THE BLACK ABOLITIONIST PAPERS 443 n.9 (1985). 
 90. Theodore Dwight Weld, The Power of Congress over Slavery in the District of 
Columbia (1838), reprinted in JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 271 (Collier Books 
1965) (1951).  Jacobus tenBroek has described Weld’s tract as “a restatement and synthesis of 
abolitionist constitutional theory as of that time.”  Id. at 243 (emphasis omitted); see also 
HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).  Akhil Amar writes that 
the right of assembly for religious worship was “a core right that southern states had 
violated.”  AMAR, supra note 30, at 245. 
 91. NAT TURNER 74 (Eric Foner ed., 1971) (quoting JAMES L. SMITH, 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JAMES L. SMITH 27-30 (1881)). 
 92. William Goodell’s 1853 book, The American Slave Code, observed that 
“[r]eligious liberty is the precursor of civil and political liberty and enfranchisement.”  
GOODELL, supra note 79, at 328. 
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from its genesis in the abolition movement.”93  Female abolitionists and 
suffragists organized their efforts around a particular form of 
assembly:  the convention.  The turn to the convention was not 
accidental.  Between 1830 and 1860, official conventions accompanied 
revisions to constitutions in almost every state.94  The focus of these 
official conventions on rights and freedoms provided a natural 
springboard for “spontaneous conventions” to criticize the blatant 
racial and gender inequalities perpetuated by the state constitutions.95 
 Women held antislavery conventions in New York in 1837 and in 
Philadelphia in 1838 and 1839.96  Two years after the 1848 Woman’s 
Rights Convention in Seneca Falls, New York, and less than a month 
before the official convention to revise the Ohio Constitution, a group 
of women assembled in Salem, Ohio, to call for equal rights to all 
people “‘without distinction of sex or color.’”97  As Nancy Isenberg 
describes: 
[T]he Salem forum stood apart from the American political tradition.  
Activists used the meeting to critique politics as usual.  Women 
occupied the floor and debated resolutions and gave speeches, while the 
men sat quietly in the gallery.  Through a poignant reversal of gender 
roles, the women engaged in constitutional deliberation, and the men 
were relegated to the sidelines of political action.98 
In other words, the very form of the convention conveyed the suffragist 
message of equality and disruption of the existing order. 
 Women’s conventions often met with harsh resistance.  When 
Angelina and Sarah Grimké toured New England on a campaign for 
the American Anti Slavery Society in 1837, they were rebuked for 
lecturing before “promiscuous audiences.”99  The following year, 
Philadelphia newspapers helped inspire a riotous disruption of the 
Convention of American Women Against Slavery that ended in the 
burning of Pennsylvania Hall.100  The participants of the 1850 Salem 
                                                 
 93. LINDA J. LUMSDEN, RAMPANT WOMEN:  SUFFRAGISTS AND THE RIGHT OF 
ASSEMBLY, at xxiii (1997).  Lumsden has suggested that “virtually the entire suffrage story 
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convention were denied the use of the local school and church.101  An 
1853 women’s rights convention at the Broadway Tabernacle in New 
York degenerated into a shouting match when hecklers interrupted the 
speakers.  Rather than criticize the disruptive crowd, the New York 
Herald sardonically characterized the gathering as the “Women’s 
Wrong Convention” and quipped that “[t]he assemblage of rampant 
women which convened at the Tabernacle yesterday was an interesting 
phase in the comic history of the nineteenth century.”102  The following 
year, the Sunday Times published an editorial that used racial and 
sexual slurs to describe the national women’s rights convention in 
Philadelphia.103  Isenberg intimates that proponents of these attacks 
believed that “women’s unchecked freedom of assembly mocked all 
the restraints of civilized society.”104 
 A striking example of the importance of free assembly to 
politically unpopular causes in the antebellum area occurred in 1835, 
when the Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society invited William Lloyd 
Garrison and the British abolitionist George Thompson to speak at its 
annual meeting.  Antiabolitionists reviled Thompson, calling him an 
“artful, cowardly fellow” who “always throws himself under the 
protection of the female portion of his audience when in danger.”105  
The Society originally scheduled its meeting to take place in Congress 
Hall, but the lessee rescinded his offer after concluding that “not the 
rabble” but “the most influential and respectable men in the commu-
nity” intended to “make trouble” if Thompson spoke.106  The Society 
responded to the lessee’s rescission with a letter to the editor of the 
Boston Courier asserting: 
This association does firmly and respectfully declare, that it is our right, 
and we will maintain it in Christian meekness, but with Christian 
constancy, to hold meetings, and to employ such lecturers as we judge 
best calculated to advance the holy cause of human rights; even though 
such lecturers should chance to be foreigners.  It comes with an ill grace 
from those who boast an English ancestry, to object to our choice on 
this occasion:  still less should the sons of the pilgrim fathers invoke the 
spirit of outrageous violence on the daughters of the noble female band 
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who shared their conflict with public opinion;—their struggle with 
difficulty and danger.  The cause of freedom is the same in all ages. 
 . . . We must meet together, to strengthen ourselves to discharge our 
duty as the mothers of the next generation—as the wives and sisters of 
this.107 
The editor of the Boston Courier appended his own comments to the 
Society’s letter: 
When before, in this city, or in any other, did a benevolent association 
of ladies, publicly invite an itinerant vagabond—a hired foreign 
incendiary—to insult their countrymen and fellow-citizens, and to 
kindle the flames of discord between different members of the Union?  
Would not our friends of the Female Anti Slavery Society do well to 
cast the beams out of their own eyes, before they waste their pathos 
upon a justly indignant public?108 
The Society rescheduled its meeting for October 21, 1835, a week 
after its initial meeting date.  The meeting would now take place at the 
offices of Garrison’s The Liberator.  Anti-abolitionists circulated a 
handbill that was duly printed in the Boston Commercial Gazette: 
That infamous foreign scoundrel THOMPSON, will hold forth this 
afternoon, at the Liberator Office, No. 46 Washington street.  The 
present is a fair opportunity for the friends of the Union to snake 
Thompson out!  It will be a contest between the abolitionists and the 
friends of the Union.  A purse of $100 has been raised by a number of 
patriotic citizens to reward the individual who shall first lay violent 
hands on Thompson, so that he may be brought to the tar kettle before 
dark.  Friends of the Union, be vigilant!109 
The Society went forward with its meeting in spite of the threat.  A 
large crowd gathered and soon turned riotous.  Unable to find 
Thompson, some of them called for Garrison’s lynching.  Garrison 
fled through a back entrance and barely escaped with his life.110 
 Reflecting on the harrowing experience in the November 7, 1835 
edition of The Liberator, Garrison lambasted the instigators of the riot 
in an editorial entitled Triumph of Mobocracy in Boston: 
Yes, to accommodate their selfishness, they declared that the liberty of 
speech, and the right to assemble in an associated capacity peaceably 
together, should be unlawfully and forcibly taken away from an 
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estimable portion of the community, by the officers of our city—the 
humble servants of the people!  Benedict Arnold’s treachery to the 
cause of liberty and his bleeding country was no worse than this.111 
The Boston mob “became a cause célèbre among abolitionists who 
defended their right to free speech and assembly.”112  But fifteen years 
later, when Thompson returned to Boston to address the Massachusetts 
Anti-Slavery Society in Faneuil Hall, he was again driven away by a 
mob.113  Frederick Douglass referred to the latter incident as the 
“mobocratic violence” that had “disgraced the city of Boston.”114  In an 
1850 address delivered in Rochester, New York, Douglass decried 
“[t]hese violent demonstrations, these outrageous invasions of human 
rights” and argued: 
It is a significant fact, that while meetings for almost any purpose under 
heaven may be held unmolested in the city of Boston, that in the same 
city, a meeting cannot be peaceably held for the purpose of preaching 
the doctrine of the American Declaration of Independence, “that all 
men are created equal.”115 
 As Akhil Amar has observed, the nineteenth century movements 
of the disenfranchised brought “a different lived experience” to the 
words of the First Amendment’s assembly clause.116  They were 
political movements, to be sure, but they embodied and symbolized 
even larger societal and cultural challenges.  They met with slanderous 
media coverage, blatant racial and sexual slurs, and even outright 
violence, visceral reminders of the importance of protecting free 
assembly from those who would seek to deny it. 
V. ASSEMBLY MISCONSTRUED 
 Courts and commentators lost sight of the lived history of 
assembly, due in part to a judicial misreading of the text of the First 
Amendment’s assembly clause.  The interpretive problem began in the 
1876 decision, United States v. Cruikshank.117  The primary legal 
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principle articulated in Cruikshank was that private citizens could not 
be prosecuted for denying the First Amendment’s freedom of assembly 
to other citizens.118  But Cruikshank’s dictum proved more significant 
than its holding.  Reiterating that the First Amendment established a 
narrow right enforceable only against the federal government, Chief 
Justice Waite wrote: 
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of 
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing else 
connected with the powers or the duties of the national government, is 
an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, 
and guaranteed by, the United States.119 
In context, it is likely that Waite was merely listing petition as an 
example of the kind of assembly protected against infringement by the 
federal government.  The Constitution also guaranteed assembly “for 
any thing else connected with the powers of the duties of the national 
government,” which was as broadly as the right of assembly could be 
applied prior to its incorporation through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.120  But Waite’s reference to “[t]he right of the people 
peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a 
redress of grievances” came close to the text of the First Amendment.  
Read in isolation from his qualifying language, the dictum could be 
erroneously construed as limiting assembly to the purpose of 
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances.121 
 Ten years after Cruikshank, Justice William Woods made 
precisely this interpretive mistake in Presser v. Illinois.122  Woods 
concluded that Cruikshank had announced that the First Amendment 
protected the right to assemble only if “the purpose of the assembly 
was to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”123  Presser 
                                                                                                             
COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008) 
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is the only time that the Supreme Court has expressly limited the right 
of assembly in this way.124  But Woods’s interpretation has persisted in 
decades of scholarship.125 
VI. ASSEMBLY IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
 In spite of the Court’s misconstrual of assembly, the people 
claiming the right to assemble insisted on a broader purpose and 
meaning.  This thicker sense of assembly is most evident during the 
Progressive Era in three emerging political movements:  a revitalized 
women’s movement, a surge in political activity among African 
Americans, and an increasingly agitated labor movement.  In the early 
decades of the twentieth century, these groups turned to the freedom of 
assembly as an important guarantee of their ability to dissent and 
advocate for change.  In doing so, they insisted that their public 
gatherings were no less political than the institutional structures they 
criticized.  They brought together people in physical forms that both 
displayed and symbolized a unified purpose.  Their histories are 
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storied and complex, and even the most elementary treatment of them 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  Yet we can nevertheless glean 
insights into the importance of assembly through snapshots of each. 
A. Suffragists 
 The new women’s movement began at the end of the nineteenth 
century, when “[h]undreds of thousands of women joined the 
thousands of clubs united under the auspices of the General Federation 
of Women’s Clubs and the National Association of Colored Women.”126  
According to Linda Lumsden, these clubs “served as training grounds 
for the activist, articulate reformers who steered the suffrage 
movement in the 1910s.”127  In 1908, various women’s clubs began 
holding “open-air” campaigns to draw attention to their interests: 
The success of the open-air campaigns helped prompt the organization 
of the first American suffrage parades, a more visible and assertive 
form of assembly.  The spectacle of women marching shoulder to 
shoulder achieved many ends.  One was that because of the press 
coverage parades attracted, suffrage became a nationwide issue.  
Women also acquired organizational and executive skills in the course 
of orchestrating extravaganzas featuring tens of thousands of marchers, 
floats, and bands.  Better yet, parades showcased women’s skills in 
those areas and emphasized their numbers and determination.  Finally, 
and most crucially, marching together imbued women with a sense of 
solidarity that lifted the movement to the status of a crusade for many 
participants.128 
 As is often the case, the growth of local assemblies corresponded 
to the growth of the larger institutional structures that operated on a 
national level.129  The National American Woman Suffrage Association 
grew from 45,000 in 1907, to 100,000 in 1915, to almost two million 
in 1917.130  But the core of assembly in the women’s movement came 
through networking and personal connections at the local level.  
Women’s assemblies were not confined to traditional deliberative 
meetings but included banner meetings, balls, swimming races, potato 
sack races, baby shows, sharing of meals, pageants, and teatimes.131  
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Just as the Democratic-Republican Societies had earlier refused to 
limit their gatherings to formal meetings, the women’s movement 
capitalized on an expanded conception of public political life built 
upon an array of physical gatherings.  These gatherings appealed not 
only to reason but also to the emotions of those before whom they 
assembled.  As Harriot Stanton Blatch affirmed in 1912, men and 
women “are moved by seeing marching groups of people and by 
hearing music far more than by listening to the most careful 
argument.”132 
B. Civil Rights Activism 
 A second manifestation of the right of assembly during the 
Progressive Era involved political organizing among African 
Americans.  These efforts repeatedly met with mob violence by white 
citizens largely unrestrained by state and federal authorities.  The first 
decade of the twentieth century saw “savage race riots” around the 
country, including significant violence in Atlanta in 1906 and 
Springfield, Illinois, in 1908.133  Stirred by observing first-hand the 
carnage resulting from these riots, Mary White Ovington joined Jane 
Addams, William Lloyd Garrison, John Dewey, W.E.B. Du Bois and 
other prominent Americans in calling for a conference to discuss 
“present evils, the voicing of protests, and the renewal of the struggle 
for civil and political liberty.”134  The first National Negro Conference 
that ensued led to the formation of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).135 
 Based partly on the proximity between labor unrest and racial 
violence, government officials linked the increasing political activity 
among African Americans to the influence of communism, a 
connection that foreshadowed even greater problems for civil liberties 
a generation later.  Theodore Kornweibel reports that J. Edgar Hoover 
“fixated on the belief that racial militants were seeking to break down 
social barriers separating blacks from whites, and that they were 
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inspired by communists or were the pawns of communists.”136  In a 
report to Congress, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer described “‘a 
well-concerted movement among a certain class of Negro leaders of 
thought and action to constitute themselves a determined and 
persistent source of radical opposition to the Government’ . . . who 
proclaimed ‘an outspoken advocacy of the Bolsheviki or Soviet 
doctrines.’”137 
 Armed with these suspicions of communist influences, agents 
from the Bureau of Investigation carefully monitored and constrained 
the efforts of African Americans to organize through blatant violations 
of the right of assembly.  When A. Philip Randolph and Chandler 
Owen, the editors of the black publication The Messenger, arrived to 
address a large crowd in Cleveland on August 4, 1918, two Bureau 
agents confiscated their publications and took them into custody for 
interrogation.138  Undercover informants and the first black agents of 
the Bureau infiltrated local gatherings of the NAACP and other 
African-American organizations.139  An agent attending a Du Bois 
lecture in Toledo reported that the audience consisted of “mostly 
radicals.”140  In Boston, an agent reported that Du Bois’ editorials were 
urging that supporters “incite riots and cause bloodshed.”141  The 
Bureau also kept tabs on whites associated with the NAACP, including 
Jane Addams and Anita Whitney.142 
C. Organized Labor 
 The most frequent articulations of the right of assembly during 
the Progressive Era came from an increasingly vocal labor movement.  
Widespread labor unrest had emerged at the end of the nineteenth 
century with the increase in industrialization and immigration.143  The 
“Great Strike” of 1877 had involved over 100,000 workers throughout 
the country and brought to a halt most of the nation’s transportation 
system.144  By the early 1880s, the Knights of Labor had organized 
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hundreds of thousands of workers.145  The Haymarket Riot of 1886 and 
the Pullman Strike of 1894 sandwiched “almost a decade of labor 
unrest punctuated by episodes of spectacular violence” which included 
“the strike of the Homestead Steel workers against the Carnegie 
Corporation, the miners’ strikes in the coal mining regions of the East 
and hardrock states in the West, a longshoremen’s strike in New 
Orleans that united black and white workers, and numerous railroad 
strikes.”146  But these labor efforts remained largely unorganized, and 
direct appeals to the freedom of assembly by the labor movement did 
not begin in earnest until the formation of the Industrial Workers of the 
World (IWW) in 1905. 
 The IWW (nicknamed the “Wobblies”) formed out of a 
conglomeration of labor interests dissatisfied with the reform efforts of 
the American Federation of Labor.  Led by William Haywood, Daniel 
De Leon, and Eugene Debs, the Wobblies employed provocative words 
and actions.  The preamble to their Constitution declared that “the 
working class and the employing class have nothing in common,” and 
the IWW advocated this message in gatherings and demonstrations 
throughout the country.147 
 The freedom of assembly figured prominently in the IWW’s 
appeals to constitutional protections during organized strikes in major 
industries including steel, textiles, rubber, and automobiles from 1909 
to 1913.  In 1910, Wobblies highlighted the denial of the right to 
assemble at a demonstration in Spokane, Washington.148  When 
members of the IWW invoked the rights of speech and assembly 
during the Paterson Silk Strike of 1913, Paterson Mayor H.G. McBride 
responded that these protections extended to the striking silk workers 
but not to the Wobblies: 
I cannot stand for seeing Paterson flooded with persons who have no 
interest in Paterson, who can only give us a bad name, who can despoil 
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in a few hours a good name we have been years in building up, and I 
propose to continue my policy of locking these outside agitators up on 
sight.149 
True to his word, Mayor McBride arrested a number of IWW leaders, 
including Elizabeth Gurley Flynn.150  Later that year, the IWW 
publication Solidarity protested that “America today has abandoned 
her heroic traditions of the Revolution and the War of 1812 and has 
turned to hoodlumism and a denial of free speech and assembly to a 
large and growing body of citizens.”151 
VII. THE INTER-WAR YEARS AND THE RISE OF THE FREEDOM OF 
ASSEMBLY 
 The growing fear of communism facilitated gross incursions on 
the freedom of assembly across progressive movements.  As Irwin 
Marcus has observed:  “Unrest associated with the assertiveness of 
women, African Americans, and immigrant workers could be ascribed 
to the influence of the Communists and inoculating Americans with a 
vaccine of 100 percent Americanism was offered as a cure for national 
problems.”152  The rising Americanism was on the verge of claiming the 
freedom of assembly as one of its casualties.  On the eve of America’s 
entry into the First World War, President Wilson predicted to New York 
World editor Frank Cobb that “the Constitution would not survive” the 
war and “free speech and the right of assembly would go.”153  Seven 
months later, Wilson’s words seemed ominously prescient when the 
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia triggered the First Red Scare.  Over 
the next few years, the freedom of assembly was constrained by 
shortsighted legislation like the Espionage Act of 1917 (and its 1918 
amendments) and the Immigration Act of 1918, and the Justice 
Department’s infamous Palmer Raids in 1920, which “effectively 
torpedoed most notions of freedom of expression and freedom of 
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association that survived the war fought to make the world safe for 
democracy.”154 
A. A New Conception of the First Amendment 
 Despite the Red Scare, and probably because of some of the 
flagrant abuses of civil liberties that occurred during it, libertarian 
interpretations of the First Amendment that had surfaced prior to the 
First World War began to take shape shortly into the inter-war period.155  
Meanwhile, Samuel Gompers repeatedly invoked the freedoms of 
speech and assembly in his battle against labor injunctions.156 
 The growing importance of assembly in political and legal 
discourse during the 1920s is strikingly evident in Justice Brandeis’s 
famous opinion in Whitney v. California.157  Anita Whitney’s appeal 
stemmed from her conviction under California’s Criminal Syndicalism 
Act for having served as a delegate to the 1919 organizing convention 
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sedition bill “can be used to kill free speech and free assembly”); Labor Will Fight for Every 
Right, Gompers Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1922, at 1 (arguing against the denial of 
“freedom of expression, freedom of press, and the freedom of assembly”); Gompers Assails 
Harding on Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1923, at 3 (“[T]he Daugherty injunction . . . sought to 
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press to railroad workers.”).  In 1951, President Truman, speaking at the dedication of a 
memorial to Gompers, said, “[A]bove all, he fought the labor injunction because it was used 
to violate the constitutional rights to free speech and freedom of assembly.”  President Harry 
S. Truman, Addresss at the Dedication of a Square in Washington to the Memory of Samuel 
Gompers (Oct. 27, 1951) (transcript available at the American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu). 
 157. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  The decision was formally 
overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).  Brandeis concurred 
rather than dissented in Whitney on procedural grounds, but his opinion strongly rebuked of 
the majority’s reasoning.  See PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS:  JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 
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of the Communist Labor Party of California.158  The Court rejected her 
argument that the California law violated her rights under the First 
Amendment, expressing particular concern that her actions had been 
undertaken in concert with others, which “involve[d] even greater 
danger to the public peace and security than the isolated utterances and 
acts of individuals.”159 
 Chafing at this rationale, Brandeis penned some of the most well-
known words in American jurisprudence: 
Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the 
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and 
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords 
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious 
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that 
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a 
fundamental principle of the American government.160 
The freedoms of “speech and assembly” lie at the heart of Brandeis’s 
argument—the phrase appears eleven times in his brief concurrence.  
The two freedoms had been linked only once before; after Whitney, 
the nexus occurs in over one hundred of the Court’s opinions.161  The 
connection between assembly and speech highlights that a group 
expresses itself not only through spoken words but also through its 
very act of gathering.  As the Court itself recognized, group expression 
was far more worrisome than “the isolated utterances and acts of 
individuals.”162 
                                                 
 158. Vincent Blasi has written a fascinating account of these circumstances.  See 
Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage:  The Brandeis Opinion 
in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988). 
 159. 274 U.S. at 372. 
 160. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  Legal scholars have written volumes about 
these words and those that followed, and Brandeis’s concurrence has been praised for its 
eloquent defense of free speech.  Vincent Blasi has called the opinion “arguably the most 
important essay ever written, on or off the bench, on the meaning of the first amendment.”  
Blasi, supra note 158, at 668.  And Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in the landmark 
case New York Times v. Sullivan, deemed Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence the “classic 
formulation” of the fundamental principle underlying free speech.  376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); 
cf. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS:  THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY 
AND POLITICS 194 (2002); Robert M. Cover, The Left, the Right, and the First Amendment:  
1918-1928, 40 MD. L. REV. 349, 371 (1981) (asserting that Brandeis’s concurrence is a 
“classic statement of free speech”). 
 161. E.g., New York ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 261 U.S. 590, 591 (1923) (noting that 
petitioners alleged a deprivation of the “rights of freedom of speech and assembly”). 
 162. 274 U.S. at 372. 
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B. New Challenges to Labor 
 In the early 1920s, the conservative wing of the Supreme Court 
issued a series of antilabor decisions aimed at stopping picketing and 
union organizing.163  But by 1933, workers had successfully obtained 
legislative relief through the National Industrial Recovery Act, which 
provided the first guarantee to workers of the right to organize in 
associations.  Two years later, the Wagner Act sought to strengthen the 
associational rights of workers even further. 
 The relationship between the right of assembly and the interests 
of labor took on a more public dimension on April 10, 1936, when 
Congress held hearings on legislation to authorize the Committee on 
Education and Labor to investigate “violations of the rights of free 
speech and assembly and undue interference with the right of labor to 
organize and bargain collectively.”164  National Labor Relations Board 
chairman J. Warren Madden testified that “[t]he right of workmen to 
organize themselves into unions has become an important civil liberty” 
and that workers could not organize without exercising the rights of 
free speech and assembly.165  Following the hearings and subsequent 
approval of the Senate measure, Committee Chair Hugo Black named 
Senator Robert La Follette, Jr. of Wisconsin to chair a subcommittee to 
investigate these concerns.  The La Follette Committee embarked with 
“the zeal of missionaries” in an exhaustive investigation that spanned 
five years.166  When it concluded, La Follette reported to Congress that 
“[t]he most spectacular violations of civil liberty . . . [have] their roots 
in economic conflicts of interest” and emphasized that “[a]ssociation 
and self-organization are simply the result of the exercise of the 
fundamental rights of free speech and assembly.”167 
 Rhetoric across the political spectrum during the mid-1930s 
echoed the importance of assembly in the labor context.  In a 1935 
speech on Constitution Day, former President Hebert Hoover listed 
assembly among the core freedoms that guarded liberty.168  That same 
year, President Roosevelt’s Interior Secretary Harold Ickes referred to 
the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as “the three musketeers 
                                                 
 163. Cover, supra note 160, at 354. 
 164. Jerold S. Auerbach, The La Follette Committee:  Labor and Civil Liberties in the 
New Deal, 51 J. AM. HIST. 435, 440 (1964) (citing 74 CONG. REC. 4151 (1936) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 165. Id. at 440 n.30 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 166. Id. at 442. 
 167. Id. at 442 n.40 (quoting 77 CONG. REC. 3311 (1942)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 168. Hoover’s Warning of the Perils to Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1935, at 10. 
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of our constitutional forces” during an address before an annual 
luncheon of the Associated Press.169  Ickes asserted:  “We might give 
up all the rest of our Constitution, if occasion required it . . . [a]nd yet 
have sure anchorage for the mooring of our good ship America, if 
these rights remained to us unimpaired.”170 
C. Assembly Made Applicable to the States 
 In 1937, the Supreme Court made the freedom of assembly 
applicable to state as well as federal action in De Jonge v. Oregon.171  
Chief Justice Hughes asserted that the right of assembly “cannot be 
denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions,—
principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general 
terms of its due process clause.”172  In words strikingly similar to 
Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence, he emphasized: 
[The need] to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, 
free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for 
free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive 
to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained 
by peaceful means.  Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very 
foundation of constitutional government.173 
Hughes underscored the significance of applying the right of assembly 
to state action by observing that “[t]he right of peaceable assembly is a 
right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally 
fundamental.”174 
D. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization 
 At the end of 1938, the American Bar Association’s Committee 
on the Bill of Rights advocated the importance of the right of assembly 
in an amicus brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization.175  The 
appeal addressed Mayor Frank Hague’s repeated denials of a permit to 
                                                 
 169. Long and Coughlin Classed by Ickes as ‘Contemptible,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 
1935, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 171. 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
 172. Id. at 364. 
 173. Id. at 365. 
 174. Id. at 364.  Brandeis had called the right of assembly fundamental in his Whitney 
concurrence ten years earlier.  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
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the Committee for Industrial Organization to hold a public meeting in 
Jersey City.  The ABA’s lengthy brief emphasized that “the integrity of 
the right ‘peaceably to assemble’ is an essential element of the 
American democratic system” involving “the citizen’s right to meet 
face to face with others for the discussion of their ideas and 
problems—religious, political, economic or social”; that “assemblies 
face to face perform a function of vital significance in the American 
system”; and that public officials had the “duty to make the right of 
free assembly prevail over the forces of disorder if by any reasonable 
effort or means they can possibly do so.”176 
 The amicus brief garnered an unusual amount of attention.  The 
American Bar Association wrote: 
The filing of the brief was widely hailed as a great step in the defense 
of liberty and the American traditions of free speech and free assembly 
as basic institutions of democratic government.  The clear and earnest 
argument of the brief was attested as an admirable exposition of the 
fundamental American faith.  Hardly any action in the name of the 
American Bar Association in many years, if ever, has attracted as wide 
and immediate attention and as general acclaim, as the preparation and 
filing of this brief.177 
The New York Times reviewed the brief with similarly effusive 
language: 
This brief ought to stand as a landmark in American legal history.  It 
ought to be multiplied and spread about in all communities in which 
private citizens, private organizations or public officials dare threaten or 
suppress the basic guarantees of American liberty.  It ought to be on file 
in every police station.  It ought to be in every public library, in every 
school library, and certainly in the home of every voter in Jersey City.178 
                                                 
 176. Brief for the Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar Association as 
Amicus Curiae, Hague v. Comm. Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (No. 651) [hereinafter 
Brief for the Committee]. 
 177. Association’s Committee Intervenes To Defend Right of Public Assembly, 25 
A.B.A. J. 7 (1939). 
 178. Editorial, A Brief for Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1938, at 18.  The Times 
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The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the C.I.O., but Hague appealed to 
the Supreme Court, setting the stage for an even broader judicial 
endorsement of the freedom of assembly.179 
E. The Four Freedoms 
 In 1939, assembly joined religion, speech, and press as one of the 
“Four Freedoms” celebrated in the New York World’s Fair.  Fair 
organizers commissioned Leo Friedlander to design a group of statues 
commemorating each of the four freedoms.180  Grover Whalen, the 
president of the fair corporation, credited New York Times president 
and publisher Arthur Sulzberger with the idea: 
Mr. Sulzberger pointed out that if we portrayed four of the 
constitutional guarantees of liberty in the “freedom group” we could 
teach the millions of visitors to the fair a lesson in history with a moral.  
The lesson is that freedom of press, freedom of religion, freedom of 
assembly and freedom of speech, firmly fixed in the cornerstone of our 
government since the days of Washington, have enabled us to build the 
most successful democracy in the world.  And the moral is that as long 
as these freedoms remain a part of our constitutional set-up we can face 
the problems of tomorrow, a nation of people calm, united and 
unafraid.181 
The buildup to the opening of the Fair began with New Year’s Day 
speeches celebrating each of the four freedoms that were broadcast 
internationally from Radio City Music Hall.  Dorothy Thompson, the 
“First Lady of American Journalism,” delivered the speech on the 
freedom of assembly.182  Calling assembly “the most essential right of 
the four,” Thompson elaborated: 
The right to meet together for one purpose or another is actually the 
guaranty of the three other rights.  Because what good is free speech if 
it impossible to assemble people to listen to it?  How are you going to 
have discussion at all unless you can hire a hall?  How are you going to 
                                                 
 179. The Committee on the Bill of Rights had submitted a revised version of its 
amicus brief when the case had reached the Supreme Court.  Brief for the Committee, supra 
note 176. 
 180. Mile-Long Mall Feature of Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1937, at 57. 
 181. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 182. Fair To Broadcast to World Today, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1939, at 13.  Thompson 
was at the time a news commentator for the New York Herald Tribune.  She was considered 
by some to be “the most influential woman in the United States after Eleanor Roosevelt,” and 
her syndicated column, “On the Record,” reached an estimated eight to ten million readers 
three times a week.  SUSAN WARE, LETTER TO THE WORLD:  SEVEN WOMEN WHO SHAPED THE 
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practice your religion, unless you can meet with a community of people 
who feel the same way?  How can you even get out a newspaper, or any 
publication, without assembling some people to do it? 183 
Three months later, Columbia University president Nicholas Butler 
penned a New York Times editorial on “The Four Freedoms.”184  With 
the European conflict in mind, Butler warned of the “millions upon 
millions of human beings living under governments which not only do 
not accept the Four Freedoms, but frankly and openly deny them all.”185  
The following month, the Times ran an editorial by Henry Steele 
Commager.  Commager decried the assaults on the “four fundamental 
freedoms” and concluded his essay by asserting:  “The careful 
safeguards which our forefathers set up around freedom of religion, 
speech, press and assembly prove that these freedoms were thought to 
be basic to the effective functioning of democratic and republican 
government.  The truth of that conviction was never more apparent 
than it is now.”186 
 On April 30, 1939, the opening day of the World’s Fair, New York 
Mayor Fiorello la Guardia called the site of Friedlander’s four statues 
the “heart of the fair.”187  Before an audience of fifteen to twenty 
thousand, la Guardia proclaimed that the right of assembly “must be 
given to any group who desire to meet and there discuss any problem 
that they desire.”188 
 Barely a month after the opening of the World’s Fair, the Supreme 
Court issued its Hague decision, noting that streets and parks were 
publicly available “for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”189  The New York 
Times’ coverage of Hague pronounced:  “With Right of Assembly 
Reasserted, All ‘Four Freedoms’ of Constitution Are Well 
Established.”190 
 Hague’s words on the heels of the tribute to the four freedoms at 
the World’s Fair seemed to anchor the freedom of assembly in political 
                                                 
 183. Dorothy Thompson, Democracy 1 (Jan. 1, 1939) (transcript available in the 
Syracuse University Library, Dorothy Thompson Papers, ser. VII, box 6).  Thompson’s speech 
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 184. Nicholas Murray Butler, The Four Freedoms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1939, at AS5. 
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discourse.  Indeed, a poll by Elmo Roper’s organization at the end of 
1940 reported that 89.9% of respondents thought their personal 
liberties would be decreased by restrictions on freedom of assembly 
(compared to 81.5% who expressed concern over restrictions on 
“freedom of speech by press and radio”).191  Americans appeared 
resolute in their belief of the indispensability of free assembly to 
democracy, and the importance of assembly seemed secure. 
 Politics and history decided otherwise.  On January 6, 1941, 
President Roosevelt proclaimed “four essential human freedoms” in 
his State of the Union Address.192  Rather than refer to the freedoms of 
speech, religion, assembly and press that had formed the centerpiece 
of the World’s Fair, Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms Speech” called upon 
freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from 
want, and freedom from fear.  The new formulation—absent assembly—
quickly overtook the old.  Seven months later, Roosevelt and Winston 
Churchill incorporated the new four freedoms into the Atlantic 
Charter.  In 1943, Norman Rockwell created four paintings inspired by 
Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms.  The Saturday Evening Post printed the 
paintings in successive editions, accompanied by matching essays 
expounding upon each of the freedoms.  And like the earlier four 
freedoms, the new ones were also set in stone.  Roosevelt 
commissioned Walter Russell to create the Four Freedoms Monument, 
which was dedicated at Madison Square Garden.  Today, the Franklin 
and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute honors well-known individuals with 
the “Four Freedoms Award.”193 
VIII. THE RHETORIC OF ASSEMBLY 
 Despite its absence from Roosevelt’s formulation of the Four 
Freedoms, the freedom of assembly did not disappear from political 
and legal discourse overnight.  In 1941, an illustrious group called 
“The Free Company” penned a series of radio dramas about the First 
Amendment.  Attorney General Robert Jackson and Solicitor General 
Francis Biddle helped shape the group, which included Robert 
Sherwood (then Roosevelt’s speechwriter), William Saroyan, Maxwell 
Anderson, Ernest Hemingway, and James Boyd.194  The group operated 
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under what was “virtually a Government charter” to spread a message 
of democracy.195 
 Orson Welles wrote The Free Company’s play on the freedom of 
assembly.  “His Honor, the Mayor” portrayed the dilemma of Bill 
Knaggs, a fictional mayor confronted with an impending rally of a 
group called the “White Crusaders.”  After deciding to allow the rally, 
the mayor addressed the crowd that had gathered in protest: 
[D]on’t start forbiddin’ anybody the right to assemble.  Democracy’s a 
rare precious thing and once you start that—you’ve finished 
democracy!  Democracy guarantees freedom of assembly uncondi-
tionally to the worst lice that want it. . . .  All of you’ve read the history 
books.  You know what the right to assemble and worship God meant to 
most of those folks that first came here, the ones that couldn’t pray the 
way they wanted to in the old country?196 
The play concluded with music followed by the voice of the narrator: 
Like his honor, the Mayor, then, let us stand fast by the right of lawful 
assembly.  Let us say with that great fighter for freedom, Voltaire, “I 
disapprove of what you say but I will defend to the death your right to 
say it.”  Thus one of our ancient, hard-won liberties will be made secure 
and we, differing though we may at times among ourselves, will stand 
together on a principle to make sure that government of the people, by 
the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.197 
Not everyone shared these sentiments.  Following the broadcast of 
“His Honor, The Mayor,” the Hearst newspaper chain and the 
American Legion attacked it as “un-American and tending to 
encourage communism and other subversive groups” and “cleverly 
designed to poison the minds of young Americans.”198  The next week, 
J. Edgar Hoover drafted a Justice Department memorandum 
“concerning the alleged Communist activities and connections of 
Orson Welles.”199 
 Later in 1941, festivities around the country marked the 
sesquicentennial anniversary of the Bill of Rights.  In Washington 
D.C.’s Post Square, organizers of a celebration displayed an enormous 
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copy of the Bill of Rights next to the four phrases:  “Freedom of 
Speech, Freedom of Assembly, Freedom of Religion, Freedom of the 
Press.”200  The Sesquicentennial Committee, with President Roosevelt 
as its chair, issued a proclamation describing the original four 
freedoms as “the pillars which sustain the temple of liberty under 
law.”201  Days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt declared 
that December 15, 1941, would be “Bill of Rights Day.”  Roosevelt 
heralded the “immeasurable privileges” of the First Amendment and 
signed the proclamation for Bill of Rights Day against the backdrop of 
a mural listing the original four freedoms.202  The photo op was not 
without irony; less than three months later he signed Executive Order 
9066, authorizing the internment of Japanese Americans. 
 Although the Supreme Court endorsed the President’s restrictions 
on the civil liberties of Japanese Americans in Hirabayashi v. United 
States203 and Korematsu v. United States,204 it elsewhere affirmed a core 
commitment to the Bill of Rights generally and the freedom of 
assembly in particular.  In 1943, Justice Jackson wrote in West Virginia 
v. Barnette: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles 
to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to 
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the 
outcome of no elections.205 
Two years later, the Court emphasized in Thomas v. Collins that 
restrictions of assembly could only be justified under the “clear and 
present danger” standard that the Court had adopted in its free speech 
cases.206  By a 5-4 majority, the Court overturned the contempt 
conviction of a labor spokesman who had given a speech in Houston 
despite a restraining order prohibiting him from doing so.  Because of 
the “preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable 
democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment,” the Court 
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concluded that only “the gravest abuses, endangering paramount 
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.”207  Justice 
Rutledge’s opinion noted that the right of assembly guarded “not solely 
religious or political” causes but also “secular causes,” great and 
small.208  And Rutledge recognized the expressive nature of assembly 
by noting that the rights of the speaker and the audience were 
“necessarily correlative.”209  As Aviam Soifer has suggested, Rutledge’s 
“dynamic, relational language” emphasized that the right of assembly 
was “broad enough to include private as well as public gatherings, 
economic as well as political subjects, and passionate opinions as well 
as factual statements.”210 
 A further endorsement of assembly came by way of the executive 
branch in the 1947 Report of the President’s Committee on Civil 
Rights.211  The Report indicated that the “great freedoms” of religion, 
speech, press, and assembly were “relatively secure” and that citizens 
were “normally free . . . to assemble for unlimited public 
discussions.”212  Noting growing concerns about “Communists and 
Fascists,” the Committee asserted that it “unqualifiedly opposes any 
attempt to impose special limitations on the rights of these people to 
speak and assemble” and cautioned that while “the government has the 
obligation to have in its employ only citizens of unquestioned loyalty,” 
our “whole civil liberties history provides us with a clear warning 
against the possible misuse of loyalty checks to inhibit freedom of 
opinion and expression.”213 
IX. THE RISE OF ASSOCIATION AND THE END OF ASSEMBLY 
 With an irony that rivaled President Roosevelt’s Bill of Rights 
Day proclamation, President Truman established the Federal Employee 
Loyalty Program the same year that his committee issued its civil 
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rights report.  The loyalty program empowered the federal government 
to deny employment to “disloyal” individuals.214  The government’s 
loyalty determination could consider “activities and associations” that 
included “[m]embership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association 
with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, 
group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney General 
as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive.”215  Attorney General 
Tom Clark quickly generated a list of 123 “subversive” organiza-
tions.216  Within a year, the FBI had examined over two million federal 
employees and conducted over 6300 full investigations.217 
 The restrictions imposed by the loyalty program prompted some 
of the earliest articulations of a previously unseen defense of group 
autonomy:  a constitutional right of association.218  Constitutional 
scholar Thomas Emerson attacked the loyalty program in a 1947 
article in the Yale Law Journal, contending that the investigations 
infringed upon the “concept of the right to freedom [of] political 
expression” emerged from “the specific guarantees of freedom of 
speech, freedom of the press, the right of assembly and the right to 
petition the government.”219  This right of political expression was 
“basic, in the deepest sense, for it underlies the whole theory of 
democracy.”220  Emerson cited a recent speech by Charles Wyzanski, 
Jr., who had argued that the “peculiarly complicated” freedom of 
association “cuts underneath the visible law to the core of our political 
science and our philosophy.”221 
 These nascent references to a right of association emerged just as 
the Supreme Court entered the fray of the Communist Scare with its 
1950 decision, American Communications Ass’n v. Douds.222  Douds 
involved a challenge to the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which required that union officers 
submit affidavits disavowing membership in or support of the 
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Communist Party before a union could receive the NLRA’s 
protections.223  Although recognizing “[t]he high place in which the 
right to speak, think, and assemble as you will was held by the Framers 
of the Bill of Rights and is held today by those who value liberty both 
as a means and an end,” Chief Justice Vinson concluded that the Act 
reflected “legitimate attempts to protect the public, not from the 
remote possible effects of noxious ideologies, but from present 
excesses of direct, active conduct.”224  The denial of associational 
protections continued in Dennis v. United States225 and Adler v. Board 
of Education226 before the Court finally imposed some limits on 
anticommunist legislation in Wieman v. Updegraff.227 
 Despite hints of greater associational protections in Wieman—
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence described “a right of association 
peculiarly characteristic of our people”228—the communist cases 
proved inadequate for elaborating upon the right of association toward 
which Emerson and others had gestured.  Instead, the first explicit 
recognition of a constitutional right of association came in the civil 
rights context, with the Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson.229  By this time, the distinction between 
assembly and association was sufficiently muddled.  Justice Harlan’s 
opinion for a unanimous Court framed the constitutional question in 
terms of the “fundamental freedoms protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”230  He began his constitutional 
analysis by citing De Jonge v. Oregon231 and Thomas v. Collins232 for 
the following principle:  “Effective advocacy of both public and private 
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced 
by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by 
remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and 
assembly.”233  De Jonge and Thomas had established that the freedom 
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of assembly applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment; 
that it covered political, economic, religious, and secular matters; and 
that it could only be restricted “to prevent grave and immediate danger 
to interests which the State may lawfully protect.”234  Based on these 
precedents, Justice Harlan could have grounded his decision in the 
freedom of assembly.  But he instead shifted away from assembly, 
writing in the next sentence, “it is beyond debate that freedom to 
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an 
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”235  
The Alabama courts had constrained the “right to freedom of 
association” of members of the NAACP.236  These members had a 
“constitutionally protected right of association” that meant they could 
“pursue their lawful private interests privately” and “associate freely 
with others in so doing.”237  Writing a few years after NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, Emerson suggested that Justice Harlan 
“initially treated freedom of association as derivative from the first 
amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly, and as ancillary 
to them” and then “elevated freedom of association to an independent 
right, possessing an equal status with the other rights specifically 
enumerated in the first amendment.”238 
 Despite its adventitious roots, the new right of association gained 
traction in a series of civil rights cases challenging state attacks on the 
NAACP.239  By the mid-1960s, the only cases addressing the freedom 
of assembly (as distinct from the freedom of association) were those 
overturning convictions of African Americans who had participated in 
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peaceful civil rights demonstrations.240  In political discourse, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., appealed to assembly in his Letter from a 
Birmingham Jail and in his speech, I’ve Been to the Mountaintop, 
delivered just prior to his assassination.241  But by the end of the 1960s, 
the right of assembly in law and politics was limited almost entirely to 
public gatherings like protests and demonstrations.  Earlier intimations 
of a broadly construed right beyond these narrow circumstances were 
largely forgotten. 
 In 1983, the Court swept the remnants of freedom of assembly 
within the ambit of free speech law in Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Ass’n.242  Justice White reasoned: 
In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been 
devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit 
expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.  At one end of the 
spectrum are streets and parks which have immemorially been held in 
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions.  In these quintessential public forums, the 
government may not prohibit all communicative activity.  For the State 
to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly 
drawn to achieve that end.  The State may also enforce regulations of 
the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave 
open ample alternative channels of communication.243 
The doctrinal language came straight out of the Court’s free speech 
cases and made no mention of the right of assembly.244  With Perry, 
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even cases involving protests or demonstrations could now be resolved 
without reference to assembly.  The Court’s 1988 opinion in Boos v. 
Barry exemplifies this change.245  Boos involved a challenge to a 
District of Columbia law that prohibited, among other things, 
congregating “within 500 feet of any building or premises within the 
District of Columbia used or occupied by any foreign government or 
its representative or representatives as an embassy, legation, consulate, 
or for other official purposes.”246  On its face, the challenge to the 
regulation appeared to rest on the right of assembly.  The petitioner 
challenged the deprivation of First Amendment speech and assembly 
rights and argued that “[t]he right to congregate is a component part of 
the ‘right of the people peaceably to assemble’ guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.”247  Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court cited Perry 
three times and resolved the case under a free speech analysis without 
reference to the freedom of assembly.  The Court, in fact, has not 
addressed a freedom of assembly claim in the last twenty years.248 
X. CONCLUSION 
 The disappearance of the freedom of assembly from legal and 
political discourse is intriguing in a country that attaches so much 
importance to the Bill of Rights in general and the First Amendment in 
particular.  It may be that the principles encapsulated in the 
constitutional right of association embrace a kind of group autonomy 
that broadens the conception of assembly.  But I suspect otherwise.  I 
have detailed elsewhere the doctrinal problems with the freedom of 
association, both in its original form that emerged in NAACP v. 
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Alabama and its transformation in the Court’s 1984 decision, Roberts 
v. United States Jaycees.249  These cases and others have converted the 
right of association into an instrument of control rather than a 
protection for the people.  In doing so, they have lost sight of the 
dissenting, public, and expressive groups that once sought refuge 
under the right of assembly.250  They have ignored the wise counsel of 
C. Edwin Baker that “[c]hallenges to existing values and decisions to 
embody and express dissident values are precisely the choices and 
activities that cannot be properly evaluated by summations of existing 
preferences” and that “the constitutional right of assembly ought to 
protect activities that are unreasonable from the perspective of the 
existing order.”251  By losing touch with our past recognition of the 
freedom of assembly and the groups that embodied it, we risk 
embracing too easily an attenuated framework that cedes to the state 
authority over what kinds of groups are acceptable in the democratic 
experiment.  Democracy and stability may be easier in the short term, 
but in forgetting the freedom of assembly, we forget the kind of politics 
that has brought us this far. 
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